Tuesday, October 14, 2008

Unfair credit report? Fair game for defamation!

Here's a decision that is timely enough to warm some hearts: Roybal v. Equifax, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79789 (E.D. Cal. 2008)


In this case, the Plaintiffs were husband and wife Daniel and Vida Roybal. They sought to refinance their mortgage, only to learn that "approximately 100 inaccurate, derogatory entries were being reported on Mr. Roybal's credit report by Rickenbacker Industries ("Rickenbacker"), a collection agency." The couple went through a variety of steps, documented in the opinion of the court, to have these false entries removed from their credit history - but the inaccuracies kept showing up, until the couple finally had to hire a lawyer to get their credit history cleared.


Mr. and Mrs. Roybal didn't take things lying down. They sued, for a number of counts including (well, look what blog you're reading, after all) defamation. Now, in complete candor, the motion that this decision addresses is just a motion for summary judgment. That is, the defendants asked the court to throw the case out before it even got to a jury, claiming that even if everything the plaintiffs are saying is true, those facts do not support the claims for relief. The court will deny a motion for summary judgment if there is a "genuine issue of material fact" - that is, if the facts might indeed support the claims, and there is some dispute about what the facts are.


The Roybal's main claim was not defamation, but defendants' alleged violation of the "Fair Credit Reporting Act," a federal statute which requires the folks who provide credit histories to do so accurately, and to double-check if inaccuracies are brought to their attention. The Roybal's other claims were state law causes of action, including a number of negligence-based theories, as well as defamation, invasion of privacy, and false light.

The defendants argued pre-emption - that the plaintiffs could not bring those state law causes of action because the federal law prohibited negligence and defamation actions over incorrect information provided to the consumer - but the court disagreed, because here the incorrect information was provided to the bank that the consumers were trying to get a loan from.
The court also found that no privilege was invoked simply because the Roybals, in seeking a loan, had authorized the bank to get the credit report. In order to escape this privilege, the Roybals had to show malice, and this they could do:

Defendants do not dispute that inaccuracies appeared on Mr. Roybal's credit report during 2004, nor do they dispute that copies of Mr. Roybal's credit report were provided to lenders in 2004. Defendants instead argue that they are entitled to protection... because Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants acted with "malice."

However, since Plaintiffs claim to have provided notice of the inaccuracies in Mr. Roybal's credit file to Defendants on multiple occasions beginning in 2004, Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown, for purposes of the current Motions, that Defendants had knowledge of the falsity of the information contained in Mr. Roybal's credit report.


The Court gives little specific discussion to the defamation claim, because little is needed: "Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Defamation cause of action must fail because Plaintiffs cannot produce any evidence of "malice"... The Court addressed this argument in detail above." End of discussion. The false light claim is similarly treated, along with the comment that there's no reason plaintiff's can not bring both a defamation and a false light claim.

As a practical matter, the Court denying summary judgment means that these questions will go before a jury, and under the current economic situation a jury is not likely to be kindly disposed to a credit agency that reports false information, thus harming a couple's ability to get credit. In these trying times, things are bad enough without having negative falsehoods piled into credit reports, and it is good to know that a Court is letting folks who have suffered such an indignation have a shot at convincing a jury that a remedy is due.

However, as I said, a jury is not likely to be too friendly to the credit agency, and there's no point in these defendants - wealthy companies though they may be - to pay a lot of attorney's fees on the way to losing a big verdict. I would expect to see a settlement in this case favorable to Mr. and Mrs. Roybal, before a juror is ever seated.

Monday, October 6, 2008

Oprah defamation suit, arising in Africa, filed in Philadelphia


Oprah Winfrey is the subject of a defamation lawsuit filed in a Philadelphia court - the alleged defamation being that "Winfrey suggested that [plaintiff] Nomvuyo Mzamane, 39, of Philadelphia, knew about alleged abuse by a dorm matron [in a Winfrey-sponsored South Africa girls' school] and tried to cover it up." Mzamane, ex-headmistress of the school, claims that she can't get work in the field because of Oprah's allegations, but the litigation strategy may be risky. Is Mzamane an involuntary public figure, or perhaps a limited-purpose public figure in her role as (former) headmistress of a school sponsored by one of the world's most famous people?
It is likely that a court will find that there is at least a compelling public interest in the behavior of a school official with respect to the alleged abuse of students by a person under the official's control. Although Mzamane may not have intently thrust herself into the controversy, she may well be regarded as a public figure for purposes of discussing this controversy, in which case she would have to demonstrate actual malice on Oprah's part to carry a suit forward. And actual malice will be hard to prove given that Mzamane herself, in a previous interview, had suggested that Oprah "may have been guided with bad information" and described Oprah as possibly having been "ill-advised." Absent a specific statement by Oprah specifying wrongdoing on Mzamane's part, and evidence that Oprah knew the truth to be otherwise, this lawsuit likely does not survive a motion for summary judgment.

Interestingly enough, this is not the first time the talk show diva has been sued for defamation. In 1998, Texas cattle ranchers sued--and lost--over a show in which Oprah discussed mad cow disease, and the practice of cattle being fed "protein supplements produced from the wastes of slaughtered cattle" (ewww!) resulting in "Winfrey's disgusted vow that she would never eat another hamburger." The plaintiff's claimed that even though Oprah "never touched specifically on Texas cattle or named the plaintiffs," she seriously harmed their market, causing prices to plummet. Now that's market power.

Oprah moved her show to Texas for the duration of that trial. So, will she be setting up in Philly for this one? Time will tell, but this case just might be a bigger boon to Oprah's ratings than a hit to Oprah's pocketbook.

Here comes the pun: stay tuned!



Unless otherwise indicated, all images on this blog are from the Wikimedia Commons.

Tuesday, August 12, 2008

Anthrax - a suspect case

Just a few weeks ago, in Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 14901 (4th Cir. 2008), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a long-litigated defamation case brought against the New York Times by Dr. Steven J. Hatfill, a biodefense research scientist that a Times reporter had suggested as a possible suspect in the 2001 anthrax mailings to the U.S. Congress and various news organizations. There is some irony that this opinion was handed down two weeks before the suicide of Dr. Bruce Edward Ivens, also a biodefense researcher, who the FBI has since identified as the lone party responsible for the mailings.

The court summarized the alleged defamation as follows:

In a series of five columns appearing in The New York Times from May 2002 to August 2002... Kristof used information provided by experts and other sources to profile a suspect in the attacks, ultimately focusing on Dr. Steven J. Hatfill, a biodefense research scientist. With each publication, Kristof identified new evidence suggesting Dr. Hatfill as a prime suspect. The columns noted that Dr. Hatfill had access to anthrax, had knowledge of how to make it, and had a motive. In the same columns, Kristof criticized the FBI for not investigating the facts against Dr. Hatfill. He characterized its investigation as "lackadaisical" and "unbelievably lethargic" and admonished that the FBI's investigatory attitude "continues to threaten America's national security." By August 13, 2002, however, when Kristof wrote his last column on this issue, he observed that the FBI had appreciably intensified its investigation, leading Kristof to conclude, "there is reason to hope that the bureau may soon be able to end this unseemly limbo by either exculpating Dr. Hatfill or arresting him."


The question that the appellate court focused on in determining whether the case was properly dismissed was whether Hatfill was a "public figure," which would give the newspaper additional protection under the First Amendment. If Hatfill was such a figure, he would be required to show "actual malice" on the part of the newspaper to recover for false claims. In this case, Hatfill was not an elected official or a person of particular celbrity or notoriety prior to the attacks, but the Court noted that Hatfill could still be considered a "limited purpose public figure" if he had taken steps to thrust himself to the forefront of the public controversy at issue in the defamation case. The Court found that the public controversy at issue went beyond the particular attacks in 2001, and related to bioterror attacks in general - a topic for which Hatfill had promoted himself as an expert through lectures and and in newspaper interviews before and the attacks, and in additional media appearances after the attacks but before the New York Times columns ran.

Once Hatfill was found to be a limited purpose public figure, the Court easily found that there was no "actual malice," which would have required the New York Times reporter to have actual knowledge that the claims were false. To the contrary, the Court found:

[T]he record contains substantial evidence to support The New York Times' contention that Kristof actually believed that Dr. Hatfill was the prime suspect. At the time that Kristof wrote his columns, he knew from several sources that Dr. Hatfill fit the profile that the FBI had developed and that he had been identified specifically by the FBI as a suspect who should be investigated carefully. In conducting research for his columns, Kristof had reviewed many previously published articles about Dr. Hatfill, which recounted that he had been questioned by the FBI more than once; that he had voluntarily vaccinated himself against anthrax shortly before the mailings; that he had access to labs where anthrax was stored; that he had knowledge about anthrax's use as a weapon; that he had strong views about the bioterrorism threat; that he had agreed that his "background naturally drew the FBI's attention"; that he had spoken frequently about possible bioterrorism; and that he lost his security clearance after he failed a polygraph test shortly before the mailings. In addition, Kristof reviewed numerous documents, including Dr. Hatfill's resume and various reports, papers, and letters written by him describing his knowledge of bioterrorism and biological weapons.


The protections that the First Amendment extends to defamation defendants are broad, and have been criticized for their breadth. There can be little doubt that Hatfill was injured by accusatory writings directed against him, and it is likely that the litigation was a great expense. Perhaps a countervailing concern that the courts should consider is the need for private citizens who happen to develop expertise in areas where controversy might arise to be restored to some level of public footing when a controversy does indeed arise. After all, every biodefense researcher is a potential suspect in a biological attack, and it would therefore be good policy to avoid discouraging people from entering this useful field by assuring them that incorrect suspicions against them would be recompensed to some degree.

Tuesday, August 5, 2008

Election year trademark politics

I am again straying away from defamation matters to note that within the past week and a half, the United States Patent and Trademark Office has rejected applications for trademark registration incorporating part or all of the names of two of our current leading presidential candidates. BARAK? OH BUMMER! (Application #77420522) was rejected on July 28, 2008, while MORE OF THE SAME JOHN MCCAIN (Application #77437466) was rejected on August 1, 2008. In both instances the rejection was "refused under Section 2(c) of the Trademark Act, for the record does not include the written consent" of the person named.

The McCain mark was also rejected on the basis of "likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3333658" - which happens to be the familiar "McCain" logo under a star which Senator John McCain has been using throughout this campaign (and for which McCain's "consent is of record").

Of interesting note, the application for BARAK? OH BUMMER! was filed on March 12, 2008, the application for MORE OF THE SAME JOHN MCCAIN was filed a few weeks later, on April 2, 2008, and by a completely unrelated party. Both rejections were authored by USPTO examiner Karen Bush, who has authored a number of other rejections for marks containing McCain and/or Obama, leading me to suspect that Ms. Bush has been designated as the go-to person for handling these election year issues.

As I said, this is not a defamation matter. The purpose of the restriction on unconsenting use of a person's name is not to prevent the registration of marks which defame that person (although there is a separate restriction under Section 2(a) for "matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead"). Rather, it is to prevent sellers from taking advantage of the reputation of the referenced indivual. Although this policy is not spelled out in the statute, surely no one would mistake the above marks as efforts to fool the public into thinking that products bearing them were made by or endorsed by the named individuals.

An interesting sidenote on the nature of trademarks is that John McCain's ownership of the "McCain" mark not only prevents uses such as the above, but would also prevent a person whose name was in fact McCain from obtaining a trademark registration in their own name in support of their own candidacy for public office. "McCain" is not a terribly uncommon surname, and in fact there are several Canadian politicians who share that name. Indeed, John McCain could conceivable sue such a person to prevent them from selling campaign materials under their own name!

Friday, August 1, 2008

Did John McCain invade Paris Hilton's rights?

While not quite a "defamation" issue, John McCain's campaign recently made news by using - and according to some, abusing - the image of Paris Hilton, purportedly as a means of painting rival candidate Barack Obama as "the biggest celebrity in the world." However, Hilton has the legal right to control the use of her image, especially when it is being used to market a product. And, as it turns out, the McCain camp did not check with Hilton before using her image to market their product. This has not passed unnoticed by Hilton, who "blasted the McCain camp for using her image without asking for permission," and whose representatives reported that "Miss Hilton was not asked, nor did she give permission for the use of her likeness in the ad."

In short, the ad may constitute a violation of the privacy or right of publicity laws of quite a few states (a quirk of the area of law is that the term "privacy" is often used to denote "publicity" rights). This opens the door for Hilton to potentially recover a financial penalty from the McCain Campaign. However controversial the basis of her publicity may be, there can be no doubt that, with the price Paris Hilton is typically paid for the use of her image, it is well-recognized as a valuable commodity.

The likely counter-argument is that McCain's use of Hilton's image was protected "political speech," for which a higher degree of leeway is generally permitted than for pure commercial speech. However, even the political speech doctrine is not without limits. If McCain's campaign staff decided to make a commercial showing bouncing basketballs in order to decry Obama's athleticism, they could not walk out of a sporting goods store with armloads of basketballs and refuse to pay for them because they were to be used as part of a political message. Nor could campaign workers use film on a privately-owned basketball court without first obtaining the permission of the owner (and likely paying the going rate to rent the space) - even if they left the edifice exactly as they found it. So it is with the image of Paris Hilton, an article of commerce of determinable value which could have been ascertained prior to its use, and for which permission should have been asked.

Were I advising McCain's campaign, I would tell them to immediately pull that ad (or at the very least remove the imagery of Paris Hilton, and of Britney Spears if it too is unauthorized). Even campaign donors unrelated to the victim are unlikely to be pleased with the prospect of some portion of their donations landing in Hilton's pockets, by a settlement or a judgment.


All images used in this blog are from the Wikimedia Commons.

Friday, July 25, 2008

An orgy yes, but no Nazi theme.

This is a pretty straightforward case, but the facts are memorable, to say the least. In March of 2008, the British tabloid News of the World reported that Max Rufus Mosley, the London-born president of the Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile, had hired five prostitutes to act out a Nazi prison camp fantasy. Mosley does not dispute that he had hired the ladies to help him act out certain fantasies - the report indicates that "the court was played covertly recorded videos that showed Mosley being bound and whipped, then relaxing naked with a cup of tea." The part that Mosley denied, however was the "Nazi" aspect:

Mosley told the court he had an interest in sadomasochism going back 45 years, but said he found the idea of Nazi sex fantasies abhorrent. He said he and the women acted out a German prison scenario, with no Nazi overtones.


Really, there's not much more that can (or must) be said with respect to the facts. Judge for yourself:



So why the blog? Because Mosley sued the News of the World, for invasion of privacy, and in part for falsely claiming that there was a Nazi angle to his, ahem, hobby. And, with a speed that would spin heads in an American court, the UK tribunal completed a trial and came down with a decision awarding Mosley $120,000 in damages and legal costs of about $1.7 million.

In the U.S., aspects of this case may well have turned out differently, as Mosley's prominent position in a popular sport would have made him a public figure, held to a higher standard for a defamation cause of action. Put up against an "actual malice" standard, it would be hard to say that the tabloid had acted with reckless disregard for the truth in using "Nazi" to describe a German prison scenario in which one participant wore a Luftwaffe jacket. Seriously, how big a leap must one make to get there from an abusive "German prison" fantasy? Does that not, by itself, bring Nazism to mind? In Mosley's defense, utterly bizarre as it is, at least the role-playing prostitutes suggest that he is in prison for committing an actual crime, rather than for his ethnic origin.

A final note - although U.S. law on the subject varies widely from state to state, many jurisdictions pose harsh penalties for surreptitious audiotaping. In Florida at least, the defendants would have been subject to a fairly stiff penalty - although not stiffer than the penalty faced by Mosley for being such a naughty prisoner!

Thursday, July 3, 2008

A win for Wikipedia

Literary agent Barbara Bauer has lost a defamation action against Wikipedia, the volunteer-created internet encyclopedia. Bauer "alleged that Wikimedia Foundation defamed her by publishing numerous false statements, including one that said she was 'The Dumbest of the 20 Worst" literary agents and that she had "no documented sales at all'" - pretty harsh statements, so why did the judge throw out the case? Did Wikipedia successfully raise truth as a defense, and offer proof sufficient to defeat the claim? No, Wikipedia slid out through a side door - the Communications Decency Act (CDA).


Passed by Congress in 1996, the CDA is best known as the vehicle that tried to stop internet porn by preventing the posting of materials that might reach persons under the age of eighteen. However, one provision of that act was addressed to the defense of companies hosting blogs, forums, bulletin boards, and the like. This is Section 230, which immunizes everyone who is a "provider or user of an interactive computer service" from liability for posting content from some other source. The corporate entity behind Wikipedia, it should be noted, plays virtually no editorial role in the content of the site, only rarely stepping in to delete content after people have raised complaints about it.

However, potential defamers, don't take this as a license to go out and post defamatory content on Wikipedia! Bauer's case is still alive with respect to nineteen other defendants, and I would not be at all surprised of some of those were specific Wikipedia editors - the ones who posted the complained of content. The CDA does nothing to immunize individual creators of content against such suits, and it very well should not provide such immunity. The Internet provides the broadest means of communication to have ever existed, and Wikipedia is almost universally one of the top ten cites to come up when a search engine seeks out any person, place, or thing that is the subject of an article therein. Although Wikipedia has a policy of prohibiting editors from making legal threats, this policy does not effectively prevent any lawsuits (in fact it says "If you must take legal action, we cannot prevent you from doing so") - but sometimes legal action is the very thing called for to maintain the civility of our society.

As to the merits of Bauer's claims, this blog will not comment - but may very well report what the court has to say, when all is said and done.


All images used in this blog are from the Wikimedia Commons.